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NON-PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No: 05-4530
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
WILLIAM H. RANDOLPH,
Appellant
_____________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
District Court No.: 01-CR-00235
District Judge: The Honorable William L. Standish
_____________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
June 7, 2007
Before: SMITH and GREENBERG Circuit Judges, and
POLLAK, District Judge*
(Filed: June 11, 2007)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
William Randolph pled guilty to two counts of persuading a minor to engage in

*

The Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing visual depictions under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251(a). He was sentenced to 30 years in prison following the District Court’s
determination that his prior state court convictions for child molestation constituted three
prior convictions related to sexual exploitation of children. This determination was made
pursuant to the then governing statutory provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) (2001) (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e)). In this appeal, Randolph asserts a Sixth Amendment

challenge to his enhanced sentence on the grounds that the District Court made a factual
finding about the nature of his prior convictions in order to reach the 30-year mandatory
sentence. We will affirm the sentence of the District Court.1
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251(d) and the possible Sixth Amendment implications of Randolph’s sentence.
United States v. Parmelee, 319 F.3d 583, 590 (3d Cir. 2003). Section 2251(d) provided
that
Any individual who violates ... this section shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not less than 10 years nor more than 20 years, ... but if such
person has 2 or more prior convictions under this chapter, chapter 109A, or
chapter 117, or under the laws of any State relating to the sexual
exploitation of children, such person shall be fined under this title and
imprisoned not less than 30 years nor more than life.
18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) (2001). Randolph asserts that the District Court erred in imposing a
30 year sentence upon him as a result of his three prior offenses because in determining

1

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction over
this appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 1291.
2

that his three convictions for child molestation “relat[ed] to the sexual exploitation of
children,” the Court improperly looked beyond the fact of the existence of the prior
conviction to the factual predicates of the offense. See Almendarez-Torres v. United
States, 523 U.S. 224, 247 (1998).
Randolph seeks support for his position in United States v. Greer, 359 F. Supp. 2d
1376, 1379-80 (M.D. Ga. 2005). In that case, the District Court concluded that
“[d]etermining the factual nature of a prior conviction is materially different from simply
finding the existence of a prior conviction for recidivism purposes,” and is a question that
should be reserved for the jury. Id. at 1380. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
rejected the District Court’s conclusion, noting that “[t]he court was mistaken in [its]
belief” that “if anything beyond the conviction itself and the statutory elements had to be
considered in making the violent crime finding, the Constitution requires that the jury
make it.” United States v. Greer, 440 F.3d 1267, 1273 (11th Cir. 2006); see also id. at
1275-76 (conceding that the District Court’s speculation that at least some of the
Almendarez-Torres decision might be overruled by the Supreme Court “probably is
correct,” but cautioning against such prophesying). We agree with our sister court that
sentencing courts may determine the nature of prior convictions for the purpose of
applying statutory minimum sentences. However, in making this decision “the trial judge
may not look beyond the statutory elements, charging documents, any plea agreement and
colloquy or jury instructions, or comparable judicial record.” Id. at 1275; see Shepard v.
United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005).
3

As a panel of this Court previously noted, “[a]t the time of Randolph’s guilty plea
in 1978, Georgia’s child molestation statute prohibited ‘any immoral or indecent act to or
in the presence of or with any child under the age of 14 years with the intent to arouse or
satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person.’” United States v. Randolph,
364 F.3d 118, 122 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2019 (1978)).2 Thus,
when the District Court determined that the three convictions for child molestation under
Georgia law related to the sexual exploitation of children, the Court “focused only on the
statutory definitions of those prior convictions,” as it was required to do under the
prevailing case law. See, e.g., United States v. Galo, 239 F.3d 572, 582 (3d Cir. 2001).
The Georgia statute on child molestation prohibits conduct directed at or with children
which is intended to arouse or satisfy sexual desires. A conviction for such conduct
relates to the sexual exploitation of minors.
We agree with the District Court’s application of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) to Randolph
and will affirm the sentence.

2

In Dixon v. State, 596 S.E.2d 147 (Ga. 2004), the Georgia Supreme Court explained
that “[t]he ... child molestation statute[] [is] part of a legislative framework aimed at
protecting children from sexual exploitation and abuse.” Id. at 148.
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